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The paper analyses the main issues regarding the production of biofuels in Argentina, taking into account the trade, investment and sustainability perspectives. 
First of all, the Argentinean legislation regarding the production of biofuels will be analysed, especially in the light of development needs, such as the strengthening of domestic industry. The first aspect which will be underscored is the absence of requirements concerning sustainability of biofuels, and notably their performance in terms of carbon dioxide emissions and the use of land with high biodiversity value. This lacuna differentiate Argentinean legal framework from that of other important biofuel producers, such as United States and Brazil.
Secondly, the tariff policy applied to biofuels and related raw materials will be assessed and, more specifically, the use of differential export tariffs (DETs) applied to biofuels on one side and on related raw material on the other. The use of DETs, making the export of industrial products (in our case biofuel) more competitive than the export of raw material, is considered by some WTO members are being a disguised form of subsidy for national industrial producers. 
Finally, Argentinean law sets out a number of incentives for biofuel production on the Argentinean territory, whose impact on foreign investment will be analysed in the light of WTO obligations concerning trade-related investment measures (TRIMs). 
The analysis will then focus on the trade relationship between Argentina and the EU - one of its main importers of biofuels. The EU initially strongly supported the use of this form of energy on the basis of energy independence and diversification and of the perceived sustainability of biofuels when compared to fossil fuels. However, EU position changed over time due to the growing awareness of the environmental and social downsides which can derive not only from consumption, but also from production of this kind of fuel.
As a consequence, the EU submitted biofuels to stringent criteria through Directive 28/2009 related to the use of renewable energy.  The Directive does not impose any quantitative limit to biofuel production and import; however, it does affect trade in this sector by establishing that, in order to be considered as renewable energy and being granted the corresponding incentives, biofuels have to respect binding commitments in terms of CO2 reduction throughout both consumption and production stages. Moreover, precise limits are set as regards the origin of raw material used for the production of biofuels, with the aim to preserve the environment and the morality of EU consumers. 






The aim of this article is to illustrate the main issues and challenges regarding the trade in biofuels by Argentina and their impact on foreign direct investment flow directed at this kind of production. Argentina is one of the world’s main producers and exporter of biofuels and most of its exports are directed to the EU. However, the growing environmental and social awareness which characterizes the actors of the multilateral trading system subordinates trade in biofuels to complex technical requirements, capable of hindering exports and challenging the Argentinean internal industry and its production standards.  Argentina, in turn, as a developing country member of the World Trade Organisation, tries to regulate trade patterns according to its specific needs, in particular the strengthening of an internal industry. Although both these developments follow with mainstream trends of the multilateral trading system, they are subject to the discipline of the WTO, charged with the difficult task of striking a balance between public needs and free trade. Moreover, trade and investment are closely intertwined, not only in case of tariff measures – which directly pose an obstacle at the border – but also in the case of non-tariff barriers, whose impact is more difficult to assess and which generally pursue legitimate, non-trade regulatory aims. 
The article is structured in the following parts: after a general introduction on biofuels, the Argentinean legislation will be analysed, with particular attention to the regulation of export tariffs. Next, attention will focus on the EU legislation on biofuels and on its compatibility with the discipline of the World Trade Organization; this analysis will be preceded by an illustration of WTO case-law relating to the national treatment provision.  

I.	The “rise and fall” of biofuels.
Biofuels are ‘liquid or gaseous fuel for transport produced from biomass’; this latter is in turn defined as ‘the biodegradable fraction of products, waste and residues of biological origin from agriculture [...], forestry and related industries including fisheries and aquaculture, as well as the biodegradable fraction of industrial and municipal waste’​[1]​.  The most common types are ethanol and biodiesel. A further distinction concerns first and second generation biofuels: while the former are made from crop feedstock, the latter are made from non-food feedstock, such as straw.
The interest in biofuels is not a new phenomenon; starting from the seventies, some of the most important world economic powers began resorting to these products as an alternative to fossil fuels; still, motivations behind this choice were often different​[2]​. 
Europe was mainly driven by environmental considerations; starting from the end of the old Millennium, EU institutions started promoting the use of biofuels​[3]​, with a view to reducing greenhouse gases emissions, de-carbonizing fuels for transport, diversifying energy sources and developing substitutes for fossil fuels. Income diversification, technological development, better vehicle performance benefits and job creation were also envisaged​[4]​. Finally, production of biofuels from some crops constitutes a new option for farmers and therefore creates new possibilities on the market, drawing less rentable crops away​[5]​.
If, at first, the use of biofuels appeared as a solution to several problems, with the passing of time certain risks linked to their production began to be identified. The first category of risks is linked to food : raw materials used for biofuel production come from agriculture and, as a consequence, their farming reduces the quantity of land available for other crops and can potentially determine a rise in prices of food products​[6]​.
Beside this, assigning land to the cultivation of plants used for the production of biofuels has two main consequences: abandoning crops deemed to be less profitable - therefore standardizing farm production - and depleting land characterized by a high biodiversity​[7]​. This last aspect is strengthened by the fact that, generally speaking, this kind of production implies energy intensive methods, which can in turn require the use of fossil fuels and whose impact on the environment is generally harmful. 
A further element reducing the initial momentum for the use of biofuels, is the concern of competitiveness: firms started to fear the ‘carbon leakage’ occurring in other countries, i.e. the relocation of industries in States where environmental standards are lower​[8]​. This concern clearly emerges in the Energy Roadmap 2050, where the Commission stressed the need that the energy policy is not pursued ‘in isolation’ and underlined the concerns relating to carbon leakage and competitiveness. The existence of a strong industrial base implies that no transition towards a de-carbonized economy happens without distortions and losses, as energy remains an essential cost for industry. The document spells out clearly that safeguards will be kept in place depending on the behaviour of other States​[9]​.
Finally, as far as climate change is concerned, the advantages in terms of emission reductions were originally only analysed in terms of emissions generated during the use of biofuels, without taking into account those resulting from the production method​[10]​. On the contrary, it is nowadays generally recognized that the real impact of GHG emissions can only be fully assessed through a life-cycle analysis (LCA) and integrated environmental assessment (IEA), defined as an ‘approach estimating pollution potential, energy and resource usage associated with a product […] throughout its life cycle’​[11]​.  
Closely linked to this aspect is the issue of indirect land-use change. By this term the European Commission means the process by which biofuels feedstock displace other crops, which then ‘migrate’ into other non-agricultural land. This conversion can have negative consequences in terms of  GHG emissions, for example if the converted land was a forest or a wetland​[12]​, and in the framework of this debate some even argued that biofuels are unable to reduce GHG emissions at all​[13]​. 
Aware of the concerns linked to the sustainability of biofuels production, the European legislator mandates the Commission, through Directive 28/2009, to revise its criteria by 2014 (article 23 paragraph 8). A recent impact assessment carried out by the Commission supports the idea that the growth of biofuel production is a “no regret” policy for the EU​[14]​, while showing that a “business as usual” approach would not adequately address the economic and environmental challenges at issue​[15]​. 


II. Argentina legislation and trade policy with respect to biofuels 
Biofuels are regulated in Argentina by law 26093 (2006) on the Regulation, Promotion and Sustainable Use of Biofuels. The first part of the law deals with general regulation of biofuel production and commercialisation and establishes a minimum share (5%) of biomass which must be blended to fossil fuels in order to consider the derived blend as a biofuel. Though the most immediate effect of this norm is to reduce biofuels exports with respect to domestic use, the quantity of export remains remarkable, because of the high competitiveness of the Argentinean industry. 
One of the main objectives of the law consists in creating fiscal incentives for production and use of biofuels for domestic use, giving priority to small and medium-sized enterprises, farmers and the promotion of regional economies ​[16]​.
In the case of biofuels, promotion is pursued by providing incentives to companies constituted under Argentinean law, operating in Argentina, exclusively devoted to this kind of production and whose capital mainly derives from the Argentinean State or other entities (including natural and legal persons) operating in the farming sector. The law further states that priority will be given to projects aimed at the promotion of small and medium enterprises, regional economy and farming. 
This set of conditions - though not excluding, in principle, the possibility for a foreign investor to set up a production plant and to benefit from the fiscal incentives - clearly confers an advantage on national investors. The requirement that the organisation deal exclusively with biofuel production has the effect of excluding all those organisations whose activities are diversified into different business fields; moreover, the prioritised projects concern sectors (such as the promotion of regional economy) less likely to be dealt with by a foreign investor. In addition, the disincentive for foreign investors is reinforced by recent legislation limiting ownership by foreigners of productive rural land and of land in certain core productive districts​[17]​. 
However, as far as trade is concerned, the most sensitive aspect of law 26093 consists in the creation of what international trade law jargon defines as “differential export tariffs”, i.e. the practice consisting in taxing exports of a raw material at a higher rate than exports of the processed products derived from that raw material. 
Argentina applies an export tax of 23.5% on soybeans, 20% on soybean oil and soybean meal, and 5% on soy bio-diesel. The high export tariff reduces the value of raw material on the internal market, allowing domestic producers of biofuels to buy this latter at a cheaper price and, consequently, to be more competitive in the international market. 
Export tariffs have several rationales, one of which is to create a source of revenue, especially if the international price is high. In the case of Argentina, between 2002 and 2005 income from export duties represented 9.9% of total public revenue – one of the reasons why the use of DETs is deemed to be directly linked to pesos devaluation​[18]​. 
A further aim is to support and develop internal industry – coherently with the import substituting industrialisation policy followed by Argentina – and, at the same time, to discourage the export of raw material. According to other States, this practice is tantamount to an export subsidy for Argentinean producers, corresponding to the difference between the tariff rate which is applied to raw material and to processed products respectively​[19]​.   
Export tariffs are not prohibited by the WTO system, since article XI prohibits the use of import or export quantitative restrictions, while article II only deals with import duties. Moreover, as regards the possibility of qualifying DETs as subsidies under the terms of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM),  panel and Appellate Body reports were unanimous in stating that that a cause and effect relationship between the subsidy and actual or anticipated trends in exports is not sufficient for an export restriction to be qualified as a subsidy. In other words, the government action must satisfy the requirements (namely specificity and delegation of power) inherent in article 1 of the SCM Agreement​[20]​. 
Export restrictions have also been perceived by some WTO members as constituting prohibited TRIMs (trade-related investment measures), as in the case of Ukraine, whose practice of granting an export tax exemption to certain agricultural producers has been challenged during the accession stage​[21]​.    
In other words, though DETs can be perceived as unfair, they are not regulated by existing legal tools. The distortive effects of DETs have underlined by WTO members involved in the last Trade Policy Review of Argentina ; in particular, the US criticised the use of export taxes on wheat, corn, beef, and dairy products, allegedly aimed at maintaining low domestic prices ​[22]​.
Finally, the issue of DETs is part both of the non-agricultural market access and of the agricultural negotiations under the Doha agenda, but no consensus has been reached on the issue​[23]​. However, this lack of regulation has not prevented WTO members from including the elimination of DETs (along with other export restrictions) in the accession protocols of some new acceding States​[24]​.
For its part, Argentina (like other developing countries using DETs) argues that this technique simply counterbalances tariff escalation enacted by industrialised countries, consisting in imposing higher import duties on semi-processed products than on raw materials, and higher still on finished products​[25]​. However, a twofold objection can be raised in this regard: tariff escalation will in some way be dealt with, as it is part of negotiations on market access, while DETs have actually been dropped from the agenda. Moreover, some developing countries simply argue that DETs are a means to reach their development goals, on the basis of the “infant industry” argument​[26]​. 
However, the impact of this tariff structure is not limited to trade, but also extends to investment flows. In general terms, imposition of DETs can reduce incentives for suppliers to increase their production and investment, especially where these latter are long-term and require large amounts of capital​[27]​. This is even more true in the case of FDIs: a foreign investor, whose production is likely to be at least partially export-oriented, might be discouraged from setting up a production facility in Argentina. As has been remarked, decrease of long-term supply can in turn aggravate international price increases, damaging the whole sector​[28]​.  
However, other factors can counterbalance this situation and attract foreign investments. First of all, the decrease in domestic price of raw materials can also attract FDI​[29]​. Secondly, the industrial policy undertaken by Argentina in the last 10 years, aimed at creating a strong industrial base and implying the creation of trade barriers, can also induce so-called “barrier hopping” investments, aimed at satisfying domestic demand​[30]​. Of course the effect on investments is linked not only to trade measures, but also to the policy followed by the Government as regards the sector at issue: in the case of Argentina, for example, the State is currently negotiating agriculture-machinery producers to source and produce locally and several TNCs are planning to invest in the country, notwithstanding the end of the liberalisation policies for FDIs promoted during the Nineties​[31]​. 
Therefore, the net effect of the measures mandated by Argentinean legislation on investment measures can vary according to their combined impact; the presence of trade-related investment measures or of investment-related trade measures - such as those illustrated above - can also consist in new FDI patterns, such as industrial re-clustering or in breaking down of the global supply chain into multi-domestic industries created by foreign capital​[32]​.

III. The challenge of technical requirement regarding biofuels : the requirements imposed by Directive 2009/28
Technical features of biofuels have been regulated by the Instituto de Racionalizazión Argentina de Materiales, through regulation 6515/15; however, this regulation does not include any environmental or social sustainability standard. The sustainability of biofuels is currently being discussed  in the MERCOSUR context, but so far with no binding results​[33]​.
Conversely, the EU – one of the main importers of biofuels from Argentina - issued Directive 2009/28, setting out the targets of the EU in terms of use or renewable energy but also precise requirements about biofuel characteristics and production methods. EU technical standards could therefore constitute a challenge for Argentinean exports.
Directive 2009/28 adopts as mandatory targets to achieve by 2020 a 20% overall share of renewable energy and a 10% share for renewable energy in the transport sector. Still, not every kind of biofuel can be taken into account for the purpose of the above mentioned targets, nor can its production receive financial support: as a matter of fact, only sustainable biofuels are considered by these provisions. 
As a consequence, paragraph 1 of article 17 states that, in order to be taken into account for the purpose of the above-mentioned targets, biofuels must respect sustainability criteria set forth in the Directive, irrespective of whether the raw materials were cultivated inside or outside the territory of the Community​[34]​. Moreover, according to article 17 paragraph 6, agricultural raw materials cultivated in the Community and used for the production of biofuels and bioliquids also have to comply with the requirements set out by Regulation 73/2009, regulating support schemes under the common agricultural policy​[35]​. As clarified by Recital n.44, the coherence between the objectives of the Directive and EU environmental legislation requires States to take into account this latter in its entirety, and not to create a separate regime for a specific agricultural product.
Given this premise, how is the legislator actually to implement sustainability criteria? According to article 17 paragraph 1, emission saving from the use​[36]​ of biofuels shall be at least 35 %. From 1 January 2017, the threshold rises to (at least) 50% and from 1 January 2018 at least 60 % for biofuels produced in installations in which production started on or after 1 January 2017. Emission saving will be calculated in accordance with Annex V to the Directive, and compared with emissions from fossil fuels, on the basis of the following factors: cultivation of raw materials, processing, transport and distribution, fuel in use. As far as some products are concerned, default values are provided for.
Apparently, the first requirement is aimed at regulating consumption externalities, i.e. to prevent environmental harm when the product is consumed​[37]​. However, the expression ‘from the use’ refers to an IEA approach, comprising the whole process of resorting to biofuels and not just their consumption. By reading recital n.70, concerning lands with a high stock of carbon, this idea is confirmed.
As a matter of fact, if this kind of land is converted to the cultivation of biofuels, there will be a release of carbon contained in the land into the atmosphere, with the result that these GHG emissions would be unable to counterbalance the reductions emitting from the consumption of biofuels instead of fossil fuels. Therefore – the recital states – the ‘full carbon effects’ of biofuels have to be taken into account when calculating GHG savings; ‘[t]his  is necessary to ensure that the greenhouse gas emission saving calculation takes into account the totality of the carbon effects of the use of biofuels’. 
Starting from 2006, the Commission encouraged the setting of minimum standards for the production of raw material necessary in biofuel production and mentioned the potential impact of modified land-use on biodiversity​[38]​. Regarding this concern, Recital n.73 notes that land should not be converted unless the derivative release of GHG cannot, within a reasonable period, be compensated for by the emission saving resulting from the production of biofuels. This last sentence definitely clarifies the underlying idea of sustainability criteria: reduction of GHG emissions must be considered over the entire process of production and consumption of biofuels. Coherently, article 17 paragraph 4 establishes that biofuel shall not be made from raw material obtained from land with high carbon stock, dividing it into three categories, among which, first of all, wetlands, i.e. land that is covered with or saturated by water permanently or for a significant part of the year. The second and third kind of land deemed to have a high carbon stock are continuously forested areas. The Directive sets out precise criteria regarding width of land, height of trees and canopy cover. These kinds of lands have been identified through national inventories of GHG and are therefore based on a scientific rationale; still, some room for misunderstanding exists, if we consider that, as has been remarked, the expression ‘continuously forested areas’ could be interpreted to include oil plantations, with the result that a conversion from forest to palm oil plantation would not per se constitute a breach of the criterion​[39]​.
The European legislator was of course aware of the main problem underlying these norms: the calculation of the GHG impact deriving from land conversion of land carbon stocks. Coherently with these statements, in 2010 the Commission issued a decision setting standards for the calculation of land carbon stocks, based on the work of the IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories​[40]​. 
GHG reductions, however, are not the only aim pursued by sustainability criteria, but they are matched to a moral and ‘purely’ environmental point of view: European consumers would find it ‘unacceptable’ that the use of biofuels resulted in the destruction of biodiverse land or of lands designated, at the national or international level, for nature protection purposes. 
As a consequence, according to article 17, biofuels shall not be made from raw material obtained from land with high biodiversity value, whose characteristics are set forth. The first category of land are primary forests and wooded land, where there is no clear visible indication of human activity and the ecological processes are not significantly disturbed. 
The second category of land with high biodiversity value refers to areas designated for nature protection purposes or for the protection of rare, threatened or endangered ecosystems or species recognized by international agreements or included in lists drawn up by intergovernmental organizations or by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature. International agreements of this kind must be recognized by the Commission according to article 18 paragraph 4.
Still, a derogation to the prohibition to produce biofuels on this kind of land is given by the possibility to demonstrate that the production of raw material does not interfere with nature protection purposes.
The third kind of land is highly biodiverse grassland. According to recital n.69, this category includes highly biodiverse savannahs, steppes, scrublands and prairies. The Commission will establish appropriate criteria and geographical ranges to define such highly biodiverse grasslands in accordance with the best available scientific evidence and relevant international standards. 
Finally, biofuels produced from raw material obtained through peatlands are excluded, on the basis of the high environmental value of these habitats, unless evidence is provided that the cultivation and harvesting of that raw material does not involve drainage of previously undrained soil.
Economic operators are required to show that biofuels comply with sustainability criteria and, in order to do this, they can either set up a national system, or make use of a ‘voluntary scheme’ that the Commission has recognized for the purpose, or finally comply with a bilateral or multilateral agreement concluded by the Union and which the Commission has recognized​[41]​. On 19 July 2011, seven voluntary schemes were recognized​[42]​ among which, however, the one proposed by the Argentinean Chamber for Biofuels did not feature.

IV. The discipline of technical requirements in the WTO: the PPMs issue
Once the requirements set by Directive 2009/29 have been analysed, and in the light of the absence of similar standards in Argentinean legislation, we can wonder whether the former can be challenged as an illegitimate trade obstacle in front of WTO judicial organs. In order to trace the development of WTO case law and assess the compatibility of EU legislation, an introduction of the notion of PPMs is indispensable.
The term ‘PPMs’ means ‘process and production methods’ and it has been defined by the OECD ‘as the way in which products are manufactured or processed and natural resources extracted or harvested’. According to the same source, PPMs can be distinguished according to the fact that they affect the characteristics of the products (product-related PPMs) or the production stage, leaving no trace in the product itself (non product-related PPM)​[43]​. Especially since the first Tuna-dolphin report, the term is routinely used in order to refer to restrictions based on the use of certain process and production methods, notwithstanding the fact that the concept itself is not related to the idea of a restriction and that, in any case, the text of the General Agreement is completely silent on the matter.
PPMs have further been classified in: how-produced standards; government-policy PPMs and producer characteristics​[44]​. The first ones concern methods used for manufacturing good​[45]​, whereas government-policy requirements set conditions, imposed by a Government, about the production process​[46]​. Finally, producer-characteristic standards establish which conditions must be satisfied by economic operators (producers or importers). 
Broadly speaking, there are some core arguments against the use of PPMs. First of all, PPMs would interfere with the operation of  competitive advantage. International trade being based on different countries’ endowments and characteristics, imposing this kind of requirement would mean undermining the very foundation of the system itself​[47]​. 
The second reason lies in the “coercion” argument: PPMs impinge upon States’ regulatory autonomy by indirectly inducing foreign producers to meet the requirements set by the importing State. However, not only is this argument flawed by the fact that “coercion” feature  can also stem from regulations setting out product characteristics​[48]​ but, as will be explained later, WTO jurisprudence seems to have gradually accepted the idea of  “coercion”.
Finally, the third argument is based on the extraterritorial effects of the PPMs, which would constitute an indirect, back-door form of legislation, regulating behaviour taking place outside the border of the regulating State. In general terms, the most authoritative doctrine refuses this idea on the basis of a conception of the WTO system granting a “negative right of non-discrimination” and not a positive one. In other words, no general right to export exists, but countries are free to decide what products they are willing or not willing to import​[49]​. According to this approach, the only category of measures illegal as genuinely coercive and extraterritorial are country-based PPMs, as they actually try to force foreign governments over which the regulating State has no jurisdiction​[50]​. 
The PPMs issue was first raised with the well-known Tuna-Dolphin dispute, deriving from a trade ban imposed by the US on all the tuna fished with the use of ‘purse-seine’ nets. The ban of this technology was a consequence of the enforcement of an internal US law (the Marine Mammal Protection Act), aimed at reducing the rate of incidental catch of dolphins to levels approaching zero​[51]​. The use of ‘purse-seine’ nets implied, as a matter of fact, incidental catches of dolphins, whose presence is often associated with that of tuna. 
The trade restriction at issue could be characterized as a border measure under article XI (prohibition of quantitative restriction on imports or exports) or as an internal regulation, falling under article III (imposing, with respect to internal taxes and regulations, the application to imported products of a treatment not less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products). The issue is one of fundamental importance, because the application of article III implies the assessment of products’ likeness and less favourable treatment, whereas the application of article XI directly leads to the search of a justification and, therefore, to article XX. 
The application of article III was supported by the existence of an additional note to this provision – the Ad Note – establishing that if a measure applied at the border is the enforcement of a regulation applying equally to domestic and foreign products, this restriction can be covered by article III. However, the panel affirmed that “Article III only covers measures affecting products as such” and in so doing laid down the bases for the distinction between product and non product-related PPMs​[52]​.
Scholars are quite unanimous in accusing the first Tuna-dolphin Report of having created confusion about the coverage of article III and, more precisely, for having established the idea that non-product related PPMs are outside the scope of this provision and are instead a violation of article XI​[53]​. This reasoning has been criticized on the basis of the assumption that the coverage of article III extends to all types of measures (fiscal or regulatory) and that process-based measures are internal measures​[54]​. More precisely, the “likeness” requirement underlying article III has no definition in the General Agreement and there is reason to believe that the one provided for by case-law – according to which likeness has to be assessed in the basis of (i) the properties, nature and quality of products;  (ii) the end-uses of products;  (iii) consumers’ perceptions and behaviour – with respect to products;  and (iv) the tariff classification of products​[55]​ - would by itself exclude PPMs.
Once it was established that the US measure was a violation of article XI, the only possibility for the United States was to invoke general exceptions ex article XX, with the aim of justifying the ban as a measure necessary in order to protect animal life (paragraph b).
According to the panel, the ‘basic question’ posed by the dispute, i.e. the legality of measures aimed at protecting goods (such as animal life) situated outside the importing State's jurisdiction, is not clearly answered by the text of article XX​[56]​. Stressing the presence of a proviso (dropped before the adoption of the definitive version of the General Agreement) requiring measures adopted on the basis of article XX to be linked to corresponding measures in the importing country, the panel establishes the intention of the drafters to restrict the scope of measures to the jurisdiction of the country adopting them​[57]​. 
This reasoning was strengthened by the idea that, if the interpretation proposed by the US were adopted, 

each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health protection policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement. The General Agreement would then no longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade among all contracting parties but would provide legal security only in respect of trade between a limited number of contracting parties with identical internal regulations​[58]​.

According to the panel, the extraterritorial measure adopted by the US does not meet the necessity test imposed by article XX, as the importing party has not exhausted all the options reasonably available in order to pursue its aim​[59]​. 
The approach taken by the panel in the Tuna-Dolphin dispute has never been explicitly rejected​[60]​ even though the analysis of the jurisprudence shows a progressive shift towards acceptance of extraterritorial measures. 
This tendency emerges in the Shrimp-Turtle dispute, concerning a measure similar to that adopted in the Tuna-Dolphin case​[61]​. The US invoked article XX paragraph g)​[62]​ in order to justify the measure adopted and the Appellate Body, while stating not to ‘pass upon the question of whether there is an implied jurisdictional limitation’ in this provision, still makes some relevant statements about the issue. 
Considering the migratory nature of sea turtles, the Appellate Body notes that, in the specific circumstances, there is a ‘sufficient nexus’ between sea turtle populations and the United States for the purposes of article XX paragraph g).  Even though by an obiter dictum, the supreme WTO judicial organ thus implicitly admits the legality of an extraterritorial measure, based on the production method used​[63]​. This orientation seems to be strengthened by the statement that requiring compliance from exporting countries with certain policies imposed by the importer cannot render a measure a priori incapable of justification through article XX​[64]​. 
A fundamental step towards the recognition of the legality of trade obstacles based on PPMs comes from the Asbestos case, deriving from the implementation of a French law banning manufacture, import, domestic marketing, exportation and sale of all varieties of asbestos fibres or any product containing asbestos​[65]​.  According to the panel report, the measure was in principle incompatible with GATT article III paragraph 4, but it was justifiable under article XX paragraph b) as a measure taken to protect human life. More precisely, the panel stated the similarity between products containing chrysotile and substitute products, so rejecting the idea, supported by the EC, that these products were unlike because of the different human health risks they pose​[66]​.
Starting from the premise that the aim of article III is to maintain equality of the competitive relationship​[67]​ between the domestic and imported products, the Appellate Body reversed the panel finding, assuming that health risks associated with a product may be relevant to the inquiry into the physical properties of a product when making a determination of likeness. When assessing physical properties, judicial organs have to take into account the fact that a product contains a carcinogenic fibre​[68]​. 
The Asbestos Report therefore marks a sharp evolution in the WTO jurisprudence regarding likeness, introducing the idea that the effect of a product on human health might make two products different. 
Could this pave the way for consideration of PPMs in the assessment of WTO-legality? On one hand, the risk criterion covers ‘hidden’ product-characteristics, introducing elements which are identifiable only in the medium-long term and which are on the border between the way a product is and the way a product is made. On the other, it must be pointed out that, according to the Appellate Body view, health risks fall into the category of physical properties, but the concept of PPMs has not been recalled. Here, again, the distinction between product-related and non-product related PPMs shows its limits.
Apart from the WTO jurisprudence, gradually accepting the idea of extraterritoriality, a recent judgement by the Court of Justice of the EU regarding the application of the European Trading System to civil aviation activities took a definite stand in favour of measures concerning activities which take place, partially or entirely, outside the territory of the country applying the sanction​[69]​.   In his observation, the Advocate General admitted that, “undoubtedly” Directive 2008/101 takes into account events taking place outside EU territory and states that “this might indirectly give airlines an incentive​[70]​ to conduct themselves in a particular way” [...] in particular to consume as little fuel as possible and expel as few greenhouse gases as possible​[71]​ - notwithstanding the fact that no precise rule about their conduct is mandated by the Directive. According to the AG, the decisive element is the existence of a “sufficient link”​[72]​, similarly to what is stated by the Shrimps jurisprudence. The reference to the idea of an incentive appears as a key concept in order to explain and justify the presence of extraterritorial effect of a measure in the framework of the multilateral trading system. If on one hand the “coercion” argument goes a bit too far by assimilating a regulation based on a PPM to an extraterritorial regulation, on the other it would be naive to ignore any effect of such a regulation on the exporting State regulatory autonomy: the concept of incentive therefore strikes a balance between these two positions. Other arguments used by the AG - such as the proportionality and polluter pays principle​[73]​, or the global nature of environmental problems​[74]​ - are equally correct in sustaining the legitimacy of the EU measure, but the incentive argument, in my opinion, is particularly effective in grasping the specificity of the WTO trading environment.  

V. The recent health and environment disputes : a competition based approach
The importance of risk in the assessment of likeness has further been highlighted in the recent Clove cigarettes report. The panel, called to assess the legitimacy of a US trade ban over clove cigarettes in the light of article 2 paragraph 1 of the TBT Agreement - whose content basically reproduces that of GATT article III - rejects the ‘competition-based approach’ adopted by the Appellate Body in the Asbestos case, stating that the likeness analysis must instead be permeated by the regulatory aim of the measure (in this case health protection)​[75]​, therefore recalling the “aim and effect” theory which constitutes a long-debated issue in WTO doctrine​[76]​.
Not only : the same panel seems to put into discussion the very concept of likeness meant as a term conveying an univocal meaning. This idea is affirmed by a statement from the US (defined by the panel as ‘a very useful hypothetical’) according to which ‘certain products may be considered like in certain contexts but not in others’, depending on the kind of measure at issue, as the objective sheds light on the whole likeness analysis​[77]​. 
However, this aspect of the Report has been reversed by the Appellate Body which recalled its own jurisprudence in the Asbestos Report, where it stated that “the word 'like' in Article III paragraph 4 is to be interpreted to apply to products that are in […] a competitive relationship”​[78]​, which is to be considered in isolation​[79]​ from the measure at issue; as a consequence, the regulatory purpose cannot play any role in the context of this assessment. 
This position is supported not only by the Asbestos report, but also by some arguments strictly related to the principles underlying the national treatment provision. First of all, it would be very difficult for a panel to identify, each time, the objectives of a regulation which, very often, are multiple and difficult to discern​[80]​; secondly, a  “purpose‑based approach” does not necessarily leave more regulatory autonomy to States​[81]​. Thirdly – and most importantly – according to Appellate Body the concept of like products defines the scope of products that should be compared to establish whether less favourable treatment exists; as a consequence, determining this scope on the basis of regulatory objective would distort the less favourable treatment assessment​[82]​.
Despite these considerations, the Appellate Body - aware of the fact that a purely competition-based approach would be highly criticized – assigns regulatory purpose a place and a role in the context of the likeness analysis, to the extent that some concerns (for example health concerns) are able to affect the competitive relationship, in the context of both article III paragraph 4 GATT and of article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement​[83]​. In other words, what the Clove jurisprudence seems to suggest is that likeness is not an autonomous criterion, but depends on the competitive relationship between products. Therefore, process and production methods are not in principle banned from consideration, but they will be relevant only to the extent to which they affect such a relationship. Given that this latter, in turn “informs the determination of likeness”​[84]​, it is reasonable to state that the role of PPMs is not limited to the likeness analysis, but has to be considered in the broader framework of the less favourable treatment and therefore of the idea of discrimination. 
It is of course impossible, within the limits of this work, to provide an in-depth analysis of the concept of discrimination, both in the context of article III and of article 2.1 TBT. However, for our purposes, suffice it to say that, according to recent TBT jurisprudence, determination of an impact on imported products is not sufficient in order to establish a finding of less favourable treatment, as such an impact can be the result of a legitimate regulatory distinction​[85]​. If a regulation is not implemented in an even-handed manner, on the contrary, we will have a violation of the national treatment provision​[86]​.  
The recent Tuna case, concerning the requirements imposed by the United States for the concession of label linked to the fishing techniques used by Mexico, consolidates the competition based approach outlined so far and the possibility of accepting extraterritorial measures.
First of all, the case – focussing on the compatibility of the labelling program with article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement – definitively confirms that measures based on non-product related PPMs fall under the Agreement. As underscored by the Appellate Body, the very same definition of “technical barriers to trade” contained in the Agreement includes “certain product characteristics or their related processes and production methods or, for example, labelling requirements as they apply to products or processes and production methods”​[87]​. 
As regards the nature of the measure at issue, the panel affirmed that US labelling provisions do not require the importing Member​[88]​ to comply with a requirement, but it is the products themselves that need to satisfy certain conditions​[89]​. Therefore, if the technical requirement is addressed to the product and not to the exporting State, no violation of national regulatory power arises: the importing State is ‘just’ exercising its own sovereignty in deciding which kind of products it wants to admit on its territory, coherently with the idea that no general right to trade exists.
This has far reaching-implications for the issue of PPMs: the “coercion” argument, the prohibition of extraterritorial measures and the distinction between product and non product-related PPMs is overcome. This is confirmed by the Appellate Body report, stating that whether or not the US measure had the effect of exerting pressure on Mexico to modify its practices would not be sufficient, alone, to establish a breach of Article 2.1​[90]​ 
Summing up the results of this analysis, we can draw some provisional results: first of all, the progressive emergence, within the likeness analysis, of factors - such as the risk - which could be non-product related; secondly, the consolidation of a competition-based approach to both the likeness and the less favourable treatment analysis. How this jurisprudence is going to affect the issue of PPMs in the case of biofuels will be analysed in the following paragraph. However, it clearly results from these premises that the WTO-legality of PPMs is not an issue in itself, but will depend on their effect on competition as assessed in the framework of article III. That is why such an assessment is likely to shift from the likeness to the less favourable treatment phase, where particular attention is devoted to the idea of discrimination. In the case where conditions of competitions are altered in a discriminatory way, States can always resort to article XX, within which issues of discrimination and extraterritoriality have to be once again discussed.
If the challenge for WTO jurisprudence consists in the definition of even-handedness and of prohibited de facto discrimination, the same COOL Report gives an important hint where it mentions the concept of unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination​[91]​, therefore recalling the content of the introductory paragraph (chapeau) of article XX​[92]​, likely to gain an important role in the analysis of the national treatment obligation​[93]​.

VII. The compatibility of the Directive requirement with the GATT and the TBT Agreement.
On August 17th, 2012, the Directive has been challenged by Argentina in front of WTO judicial organs. Argentina requested consultations with the EU and Spain, alleging that the Directive constitutes a de facto ban of imports of biofuel from outside the EU​[94]​. Argentina invoked GATT article III and XI, but not the TBT Agreement, although the Directive could be easily be qualified as “Document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods”​[95]​. However, given the progressive convergence of GATT and TBT case-law relating to national treatment, the results of the analysis regarding article III can be also applied to TBT article 2​[96]​. Argentina also invoked article 2.1 and 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement in relation to a Spanish Ministerial Order, establishing that computing for mandatory biofuel targets may only be conducted in relation to biodiesel produced entirely in plants located on the territory of Spain or of another EU Member State. 
Argentina invoked the prohibition of quantitative restrictions (article XI), which can easily be argued on the basis of the fact that EU legislation de facto prevents the import of Argentinean biofuel which, are things currently stand, does not comply with EU requirements. Given the jurisprudence relating to article III and the related Ad Note, it seems reasonable to assume that the Directive would also fall under this provision: its requirements being origin-neutral, it qualifies as an internal regulation ex article III paragraph 4. Not only: because paragraph 6 of article 17 subordinates raw materials cultivated in the EU  to a double requirement, i.e. to the Directive and to Regulation 73/2009, one may also argue that European farm production is put at a disadvantage in relation to foreign competitors. 
First of all, Argentina could challenge the legality of the requirements concerning GHG reductions deriving from biofuel consumption in the territory of the importing member - i.e. the performance of biofuels in terms of emissions saving – including the existence of default values just for a selected number of biofuels and fossil fuels. 
In the light of the Asbestos jurisprudence, the EU could reasonably sustain that biofuels complying and not complying with the Directive qualify as unlike products​[97]​ and that therefore no violation of article III arises. The risk for the environment and human health linked to GHG emissions would affect the physical property of the products and, possibly, consumers’ perceptions. However, the end-use would probably be identified in fuelling vehicles​[98]​ for both categories whereas, at least at the moment, differences in custom classification only concern ethanol.  
In the case of requirements concerning biofuel production or biodiversity, arguing products unlikeness appears to be more difficult​[99]​: in the latest Tuna Report the panel, even admitting the existence of consumer preferences in the US based on the dolphin-safe status of tuna and their relevance in the likeness analysis, defined itself “not persuaded” that a consideration of this factor would modify the conclusion that US and Mexican tuna were similar​[100]​. On the other hand, it would be possible to argue that the risks deriving from the depletion of global commons such as climate would be such as to render biofuels complying different from those not complying with the Directive, even though this would imply complex scientific demonstrations of the positive impact of the requirements on the environment.
However, the competition-based approach outlined above is not restricted to the likeness analysis but also (or mainly) takes into consideration the less-favourable treatment stage. 
On the basis of the article XX jurisprudence – which in this case would be applied to positive obligations such as GATT article III or TBT article 2.1 -  the existence of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination will depend on the practical implementation of the Directive, especially as far as verification mechanisms and public participation are concerned​[101]​; in order to assess this aspect, the Shrimps jurisprudence is particularly relevant: measures will be considered discriminatory where they are unilateral or they lack due process provisions​[102]​. 
Elements such as taking into account of GHG emissions from transport or the “over-estimation” of the value of primary forest with respect to countries where this resources is abundant​[103]​ could fall into this category. The former requirement (rendered more severe by the recent extension of the ETS to the aviation sector) hits exclusively and by definition goods of foreign origin, whereas the latter imposes an uniform standard on countries where natural conditions, values and sensitivities are different. Further problems can concern the existence of default values which, however, not always work to the advantage of European products​[104]​. 
According to the last Clove report, the existence of a negative impact on imports – which should be demonstrated – would not automatically lead to a violation of the national treatment provision, as the presumably legitimate (as based on environmental protection) regulatory distinction would be capable to justify such an impact​[105]​.
In the case a violation of article III being established, it could be justified through recourse to article XX paragraph b)​[106]​: the 35% standard along the life-cycle of the product could be considered as a measure necessary in order to protect human, animal and plant life in the territory of EU, while requirements relating to land use and biodiversity could be accepted on the basis of the global character of environmental problems​[107]​. 
In this context, it is relevant to underline that article XX jurisprudence strengthens the idea that an environmental measure might be covered by article XX even though its contribution to the aim pursued is based on a qualitative and not on a quantitative relationship​[108]​. 
A certain caution against this flexible approach is however recommended in the light of the panel Report concerning export restrictions of raw materials from China: the panel warned members against carrying out an assessment of the effects of a measure ‘in isolation’​[109]​ (which, in the case at issue, implied neglecting the vertical structure and the upstream-downstream interactions of the economic sector concerned​[110]​). As a consequence, the test for contribution to the aim ‘must account for those policies that may offset the alleged effect of the policy’​[111]​. This means that the positive effect of a trade obstacle against ‘not performing’ biofuels could be counterbalanced by secondary effects, such as an increased use of fossil fuels, as it is not to be taken for granted that the requirement would automatically trigger (just) a surge in the use of biofuels complying with the Directive.
A second option could consist in recognizing the violation of GATT rules but justifying it through article XX g)​[112]​. 
As far as natural resources located in the EU are concerned, the application would be quite straightforward, whereas as regards resources located outside (biodiversity) or global commons (the atmosphere), different lines of argumentation are available. It could be argued, on the basis of the Shrimps jurisprudence, that there is a “sufficient link” between the importing State and the shared resource​[113]​ or again, on the basis of the latest Tuna jurisprudence, that extraterritorial requirements are de facto admitted.
However, it must be underlined that in the case of sustainability requirements addressed to the conservation of biodiversity, an extraterritorial measure would be harder to justify, because of States’ sovereign rights over their natural resources
Finally, justification can be provided through article XX paragraph a), therefore invoking the defence of the morality of EU consumers, which is actually the point made by Recital n.24 of the Directive. The possibility of invoking paragraph a) has recently been argued by authoritative doctrine, on the basis of a pluralist approach to international trade​[114]​. The use of a moral approach would allow the overcoming of some long-standing shortcomings of WTO law, such as the application of the necessity principle, leaving to the WTO adjudicator the sole task to evaluate the contribution of the measure to the aim. Moreover, a moral exception would help solve the extraterritoriality issue, as the location of the object of protection would be irrelevant. Examples of the admissibility of restrictions based on moral grounds also come from the ECHR case- law, which recognized the right of landowners to forbid hunting activities on their land, on the basis of their moral beliefs​[115]​. The use of a moral exception, finally, would at least partially answer to the concern regarding the effet utile of article XX when invoked as an exception to article III, as such a peculiar regulatory aim would be easier to read inside the former than inside the latter. 
In the case where TBT Agreement is applied, the necessity principle and the list of legitimate objectives to which the principle is linked are contained in article 2.2 which, being a positive obligation and not an exception, will be invoked by the exporting country as a means of allegation; nonetheless, it is reasonable to think that the core principles developed in the framework of article XX could be extended to article 2.2 TBT. 
Finally, Argentina also invokes article 2.1 and 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement, prohibiting measures inconsistent with article 3 paragraph 4 of article XI of the GATT; the provision, set by Spanish Ministerial order, limiting computing for mandatory targets to biofuels entirely produced in Spain or in the EU would fall under one of the hypothesis provided for by Annex 1 of the TRIMs Agreement, such as measures imposing the purchase, by an enterprise, of products of domestic origin, or restricting the import of products used in its local production, in order for that enterprise to obtain an advantage. However, it is to be underlined that this allegation finds its basis exclusively in Spanish legislation and not in the Directive.  
Let us now try to assess this possible outcome from the point of view of a foreign investor having established or willing to establish a biofuel production plant in Argentina. 
As has been remarked in more general terms, environmental requirements can have an indirect effect on FDIs in the exporting country, as companies can hesitate to set up production plants if they fear not to be able to export in an importing country which, as in the case of the EU, imposes strict conditions on products' environmental quality​[116]​.
If the EU Directive is found to be legitimate, the consequences in terms of FDI aimed at industrial production will depend on the reaction on the part of Argentina to the ruling. If a “coercion effect” actually exists and Argentina decides to modify its production standard or to resort to the recognition mechanism provided by the Directive, all national producers will be forced to change their production process. 
The effect of this situation on FDI mainly depends on the kind of process and production methods used by the investor and on the adaptation costs. If the FDI presence was mainly based on the advantages deriving from the lack of sustainability standard and the investment is aimed at exporting to the EU, the investor will decide whether to accept additional adaptation costs or to transfer his investment elsewhere. Viceversa, if it was a “barrier hopping” FDI aimed at the domestic market, there will not be any impact.
However, if no “coercion” effect arises and Argentina does not change its regulation, the decision is completely up to investors and the above-mentioned decisions will be taken from an exclusively private perspective. Therefore the investor can decide to comply with the new standards, also considering that in the medium term similar requirements are likely to be imposed by other countries​[117]​ and that the cost and availability of raw materials in Argentina remains competitive. Otherwise he can maintain his current production methods and suffer a commercial prejudice, which can be counterbalanced by diverting part of the production to the domestic market or to other countries. Consequences on potential investors might be heavier, as there would be no costs linked to the existing investments. 
What if the EU directive were deemed to be in violation of WTO rules? Here different scenarios are possible according to EU reaction to the ruling. If EU accepts to modify its regulation and this review actually eliminates the impact on imports, FDI flows to Argentina might rise, as the uncertainty deriving from the existence of sustainability requirements would cease to exist. However, the review of national measures does not always actually erase the effect on imports, either because it is a “maquillage” which leaves the measure basically unchanged, or because those aspects of the measures affecting trade are not those which have been challenged. This would be equivalent, from the point of view of an investor, to the previous situation, where the EU regulation is considered legitimate. Another hypothesis would be the one where the EU is found to violate WTO rules but it refuses to comply and Argentina decides, upon authorization of the Dispute Settlement Body, to impose countermeasures on the same sector or in another sector. This solution, though creating a balance between members’ interests, in accordance with the philosophy of the WTO, would once again leave investors in a situation of uncertainty, especially if the retaliation happens in a sector different from biofuel production.

Conclusions 
As clearly appears from the analysis carried out so far, issues related to trade in biofuel – and their implication for investment - cannot be analysed in isolation, but are part of a wide and complex picture where economic and non-economic issues are closely intertwined. However, it is possible to draw if not proper conclusions, at least some emerging directions. First of all, the sector is of utmost importance for Argentina and, coherently with the general approach aimed at strengthening the national biofuels industry, it is likely to be regulated so as to reserve a leading role for the Government.  This attitude is not to be automatically equated to a reduction of FDI, as trade-restrictive measures (such as DETs) can also attract foreign investments precisely aimed at “hopping” these barriers and taking advantage of the rising domestic demand for this product. 
As far as the challenges faced by Argentina (and by MERCOSUR in general) related to the sustainability of biofuel production, the problem can be analysed within the broader framework of the limits to national (in this case European) regulatory autonomy set by the WTO. The recognition of the legitimacy of the requirements set by the EU  would be in line with the progressive acceptance of measures based on PPMs having (also) extraterritorial effects and, in more general terms, would constitute a strong incentive to modify production methods as well as product characteristics. If on one hand this would imply additional costs for Argentinean industry, it would also be coherent with a trend followed by the main biofuel producers and with the growing awareness of the environmental and social downsides of this source of energy. Even in this case the possible effect on FDI is not univocally linked to the outcome of the hypothetical dispute, as private investors might decide to divert existing production to the internal market, also in the light of the incentives offered by the Government.
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